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RELIGION, MORALITY, AND ABORTION:
A CONSTITUTIONAL APPRAISAL
by Mr. Justice Tom C. Clark*
Thought without action is an abortion;
action withoui thought is folly.1
Our society is currently in the midst of a sexual revolution which
has cast the problem of abortion into the forefront of religious, medi-
cal, and legal thought. In my day at the bar all discussion of abortion
was taboo. For more than sixty years the American Medical Associ-
ation had a negative policy respecting abortion. The A.M.A. 'often
sought the prosecution of any doctor who. engaged in the practice of
abortion, regardless of the merits of the individual situation. Society's
general attitude toward abortion was such that the patient was ostracised
and the doctor was disgraced. As in so many other facets of its moral
code, however, society was hypocritical in its behavior. Despite the
public pronouncements against its practice, abortions increased, especi-
ally among married women, and judicial action against the participants
decreased in proportion.
2
Some social commentators argue that Freud prepared the way for the
Kinsey Report, which in turn set the' stage for the sexual permis-
siveness that Reinhold Niebuhr called "moral anarchism."' This per-
meating permissiveness engendered a need for more efficient birth
control methods, such as "the pill," and precipitated the doom of the
old hypocrisy.
The law, lagging behind as usual, began to emerge from its quagmire
and rid itself of the archaic restraints on abortion. In 1962 the Ameri-
can Law Institute proposed an affirmative* policy declaring that the
termination of pregnancy is justified whenever (1) its continuance
would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother,
(2) the child would be born with grave physical or mental defects, or
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of United States (Retired), 1949-67.
1 The Wisdom of Nehru, 34 WIsDoM 62 (The Wisdom of -India ed. 1960).
2 R. THOMLINSON, POPULATION DYNAMICS 198-99 (1965).
3 Niebuhr, Kinsey and the Moral Problem of Man's Sexual Life, in AN ANALYSIS OP
THE KINSEY REPORTS ON SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE AND FEMALE 62 (D.
Geddes ed. 1954).
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(3) the pregnancy was the result of rape, incest, or other feloni-
ous intercourse.4
Within five years of this proposal, the A.M.A. reversed its negative
policy and adopted the A.L.I. proposal with only a few nuances.8 Dur-
ing the next two years, five states liberalized their abortion laws and
adopted the A.L.I. proposal.'
A further liberalization occurred in Great Britain with the adoption
of the 1967 Abortion Act, which permits doctors to consider the
mother's "actual or forseeable environment" in deciding whether an
abortion is necessary.7 The American College of Obstetricians and Gyn-
ecologists (A.C.O.G.) recently advocated enactment of similar leg-
islation in this country." While the permissiveness of the legislation
would contradict existing laws in all states, the A.C.O.G. made it clear
that it does not counsel disobedience to the law. It merely recom-
mended liberalization and repeal of inconsistent laws. It did not, how-
ever, advocate the legalization of abortion for any unwanted pregnancy
or as a population control device.
Various religious, medical, psychological, and legal organizations
have been striving to reach some level of accord on the issues involved
in promulgating a realistic and acceptable policy toward abortion. Em-
phasis on this topic is the result of many factors, including the chaotic
state of thinking that prevails among the professions and the public,
and the medical, emotional, and legal consequences which aborticide
has on today's society.
The Christian Medical Society's symposium on controlling human
reproduction provides a recent illustration of the disagreement that
exists among professionals concerning abortion. Distinguished clerics,
psychologists, doctors, and lawyers sought to determine what course
of action should be followed. They were unable to answer many im-
portant questions, such as: Is the control of human reproduction
against the will and spirit of God? At what stage of the gestation
period does the fetus acquire human status? What are the constitu-
tional limitations upon the State in prohibiting or limiting the control of
4 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
5 Committee on Human Reproduction, AMA Policy on Therapeutic Abortion, 201
LA.M.A. 544 (Aug., 1967).
6 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25950-54 (West Supp. 1967); COLO. Rnv. STATS.
40-2-50 (Perm. Cumim. Supp. 1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202 (effective July 1, 1969);
LAws OF MD. ch. 470 (Supp. 1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1967).
7 Abortion Act 1967, c. 87, at 2033.




reproduction? I ask myself, "Heaven knows; who can tell? Who
shall decide when experts disagree?" These and many other questions
must be answered if we are to attain our goal of an aborticide policy
that is responsive to modem society's needs and desires.'
In a recent conference the Association for the Study of Abortion ex-
perienced far greater success in agreeing on an aborticide policy. Dr.
Robert Hall, President of the Association, said that the conference
was designed to "relate what we know about abortion, and to deter-
mine what, if any, extent our attitude toward abortion should change
with changing times. . . ."10 The conference reviewed numerous re-
ports dealing with present abortion laws. One of these reports con-
cemed the effect of California's recently liberalized abortion law. It
was noted that while the number of therapeutic abortions performed
in California hospitals this year will rise from six hundred to about
four thousand, there will continue to be some one hundred thousand
illegal abortions performed in that state, because doctors are concerned
about risking a prison sentence for an incorrect interpretation of am-
biguous provisions of the liberalized law.1  The conference was also
informed that psychiatrists and physicians in various states were re-
ferring patients to doctors in states which have more liberal abortion
laws. This practice renders the availability of legal abortion dependent
upon the woman's ability to reach such states. 12  Many doctors ad-
mitted privately that they and most of their non-Catholic colleagues
perform several illegal abortions each month. Kenneth R. Whittemere
reported that his recent interviews revealed that in one small Southern
city, women had a choice between "a chiropractor, an antique dealer,
a mid-wife, a mechanic and a doctor dissatisfied with his profession to
perform the operation."' 3
The Association reached an almost unanimous conclusion that all
abortion laws should be abolished and that the right of childbirth should
9 The theological and medical scholars did agree on A Protestant Affirmation. It did
not undertake to answer any of the questions posed in the text. In substance, the
consensus concluded that as to abortion "each case should be considered individually,
taking into account the various factors involved and using Christian principles of
ethics." It suggested that suitable cases for abortion would fall within the scope of the
A.C.O.G. statement, but not including abortion for convenience only or on demand.
See CIasTIAN MED. Soc'Y I. (Nov.-Dec., 1968).
10 Meeting of the Ass'n for the Study of Abortion, Hot Springs, Va., Nov. 18, 1968,
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be left to each woman acting on the advice of her doctor. This would
have the effect of removing the issue from the hands of the legisla-
tures and the courts, which are virtually helpless to decide an ethical
question as controversial and far-reaching as abortion. 14 Whether or
not we agree with the Association's recommendations, it is readily
apparent at this point that a uniform scheme concerning abortion is
highly desirous.
Throughout history religious belief has wielded a vital influence on
society's attitude regarding abortion. The religious issues involved are
perhaps the most frequently debated aspects of abortion. At the center
of the ecclesiastical debate is the concept of "ensoulment" or "person-
hood," i.e., the time at which the fetus becomes a human organism.
The Reverend Joseph F. Donseel of Fordham University admitted that
no one can determine with certainty the exact moment at which "en-
soulment" occurs, but we must deal with the moral problems of abort-
ing a fetus even if it has not taken place.1 Many Roman Catholics
believe that the soul is a gift of God given at conception. This leads
to the conclusion that aborting a pregnancy at any time amounts to
the taking of a human life and is therefore against the will of God.
Others, including some Catholics, believe that abortion should be
legal until the baby is viable, i.e., able to support itself outside the
womb. In balancing the evils, the latter conclude that the evil of
destroying the fetus is outweighed by the social evils accompanying
forced pregnancy and childbirth.'
Most civilizations of antiquity prohibited the practice of abortion.
Ancient Judaism prohibited birth cdntrol except in times of famine.
17
Assyrian law imposed the death penalty upon any person participating
in an abortion, including the procurer.' Even pagan writers described
abortion as an evil act prohibited by law.' 9
The New Testament is devoid of pronouncements bearing directly
on the issue of birth control or abortion. The Old Testament, how-
ever, does not condemn abortion as a capital offense since the fetus




17 For studies in this area see L. EPSTn, MARRIAGE LAWS IN Ti BIBLE AND THI
TALMUD (1942); L. EPSTEIN, SEx LAWS AND CUSTOMS iN JuDsm (1948).
18 H. SAGaS, THE GRATNESS THAT WAS BABYLON 215 (1962).




proscription.20 It does declare, however, that conception is a gift of
God which can be withdrawn at His will.2 ' Many theologians today
argue that man must not destroy what God has created and that abort-
ig a pregnancy destroys the gift of human life.
22
The medical profession is far from agreeing on the time at which
the fetus becomes a human life. Some physicians argue that abortion
should be permitted with impunity at any time up to the sixth month
of pregnancy since prior to that time the fetus is no more than a growing
plant.2 On the other hand, many eminent physicians believe that the
fertilized ovum has human life from the time of conception. 4 In
support of this argument they refer to the International Code of Medi-
cal Ethics, which states that a physician will maintain the utmost respect
for human life, from the time of its conception. A third view is that
the decision to terminate a pregnancy must be made according to the
circumstances of the particular case. Among the factors to be consid-
ered are the duration of the pregnancy, the physical and mental health
of the mother, and the risk of serious fetal abnormality. This places
the burden of decision upon the doctor and renders the selection of
the physician a governing factor in securing permission to perform
a therapeutic abortion.25
Sociologists have found themselves in a similar quandary over the
issue. Some of these social philosophers argue that man is not merely
a chemical machine and that he possesses a soul from the earliest
stages of fetal development. Therefore the fetus cannot be destroyed
with impunity. The control of human reproduction, according to this
view, should concentrate on the prevention of conception rather than
on abortion.26 Other sociologists believe that there is no conclusive
evidence or persuasive argument that the fetus is human. 7  Indeed,
20 Exodus 3:21.
21 Genesis 1:28, 4:1, 11:30; Ruth 4:13.
22 Montgomery, How to Decide the Birth Control Question, C'RSTiANrTY TODAY,
March 4, 1966, at 10.
23 Stem, The Issue of Legalized Abortion, 88 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 899 (1963); J.
FLETCHER, MORALS Am ME InmNE 152 (1967); address by E. Bidinton, Symposium of
Christian Medical Society, Aug., 1968.
24 See generally PmosoPHY An EmTcs N MEDICiNE (M. Gelfand ed. 1968).
25 See Therapeutic Abortion, 98 CAN. MED. ASS'N 3. 512 (1968).
26 R. ETINGER, THE PRosPECr OF IMMORALITY 132 (1962). But see Hudeeezek,
De Tempore Animatianis Foetus Humanis Secundum Embroyologiam Hodiernam, in
XXIX ANGELICUM 162-81 (1952). See also Cyronics and Orthodoxy, XII CHRIsmiArry
TODAY 816 (1968).
27 Address by John Scanzoni, Ph.D., Assoc. Prof. of Sociology, Indiana Univ., Nat'l
Convention of Christian Medical Society, Aug., 1968.
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it cannot interact with other human beings. Therefore, there is no
proof of life in the sense that the law contemplates proof of fact.
The moving spirit of the times also raises moral issues that divide
the disciplines within themselves. A group of one hundred psychia-
trists were questioned on the morality of abortion.28  Twenty-four
agreed that abortion should be available upon demand at an appropri-
ate stage of pregnancy. Fifty-six, however, would require consideration
of all of the medical and social factors involved in each case before de-
ciding whether to terminate the pregnancy. Sixteen of those questioned
would abort only when actual or threatened maternal disaster was pres-
ent. Only four expressed other views. While this indicates a vast de-
parture from the Christian concept, it does reveal residuals of morality
affecting the opinions of over two-thirds of the group. In other words,
over two-thirds of the group would not abort a pregnancy solely on
demand.
Despite the fact that religious belief continues to permeate our atti-
tude toward abortion, most people today agree with Justice Holmes that
"moral predilections must not be allowed to influence our minds in
settling legal distinctions.120  This is illustrated by the fact that the
present change in attitude toward abortion has developed while the need
for abortion has diminished as a technique to save the life or health of
the mother or to prevent fetal deformities. Despite the medical develop-
ments, the demand for abortions has increased astronomically." This
indicates a definite change in social mores, which is undoubtedly the
result of increased knowledge and use of abortion. This attitude of
permissiveness is replacing the hypocrisy that prevailed in the last gen-
eration.
A major contributing factor to this change in attitude has been the
growing antagonism toward the double standard which permits those
with social status and financial ability to obtain abortions, while those
in the lower social and economic classes are denied this opportunity.
We are in the midst of a worldwide movement to make "the pill" and
abortion available in the slums as well as on Fifth Avenue. The
statistics illustrate the disparity between the affluent and the nonafflu-
ent. Three counties surrounding San Francisco are relatively affluent.
These counties account for sixteen per cent of the live births and fifty
28 Howells, Legalizing Abortion, 1 LANCET 728 (1967).
29 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881).
80 The Cost of Life, 60 PROCEEDINGS OF ROYAL Soc'y OF MEDICINE 1235 (1962);




per cent of the abortions in California. The less affluent Los Angeles
County with its widespread slum areas accounts for sixty per cent of the
live births and twenty-three per cent of the abortions in California.3
These facts demonstrate quite clearly that the affluent areas account
for a number of abortions disproportionate to their population density.
The increasing number of abortions subjects physicians to increased
dangers of liability for incorrectly interpreting a statute. It appears
that doctors face an uncertain fate when performing an abortion. This
uncertainty will continue unless the legislatures or courts provide re-
lief from liability. Very few states, if any, will repeal all abortion laws
as the Association for the Study of Abortion has recommended. Some
states, however, may liberalize their laws in accordance with the A.L.I.
suggestion, but we have already seen that in states such as California
this is an inadequate remedy in many respects. If the medical pro-
fession is to be accorded complete protection, it will have to come
through the judicial system.
The Supreme Court of the United States has gone far-some critics
contend too far-in permitting individual action in the areas of the
Bill of Rights. It has not, however, dealt directly with the problem
under discussion, nor do the decided cases cast much light on its solu-
tion. The best that we can do is examine related areas and draw some
analogies.
In 1922 the Court held that the right "to marry, establish a home
and bring up children" was an essential liberty within the guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment.3 2  In 1925 a public school statute re-
quiring attendance exclusively at state schools was declared unconsti-
tutional on the ground that it unreasonably interfered "with the lib-
erty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education
of children under their control."3 3 This concept was later extended to
include "the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.1
3 4
And in 1960 the Court declared, in very broad language, that where
State action significantly encroached upon personal liberty, its action
would be invalid unless the State had a compelling subordinating inter-
est in the particular activity.3 5 Finally, in Griswold v. Connecticut36
the Court struck down the state's statute prohibiting the use of con-
31 N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1968, at 77, col. 1.
32 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
33 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
34 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
35 Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
36 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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traceptives. The statute was found to operate upon "an intimate rela-
tion of husband and wife" which came within the zone of privacy cre-
ated by several fundamental constitutional guarantees, the penumbras of
which gave protection to the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of his life. The Court determined that the statute was aimed at use
rather than regulation and therefore violated the principle that legis-
lation must not be unnecessarily broad. This does not mean that judges
are given a free rein to strike down state regulatory statutes. They
must look to the collective conscience of our society in determining
which rights are fundamental and therefore protected by the Constitu-
tion.
The result of these decisions is the evolution of the concept that
there is a certain zone of individual privacy which is protected by the
Constitution. Unless the State has a compelling subordinating interest
that outweighs the individual rights of human beings, it may not inter-
fere with a person's marriage, home, children, and day-to-day living
habits. This is one of the most fundamental concepts that the Found-
ing Fathers had in mind when they drafted the Constitution. No one
will deny that a State has a valid interest in regulating the well-being
of its inhabitants, especially -when it is dealing with children, who are
more susceptible to undesirable influences. We have also seen that a
State may not unreasonably interfere with the intimate relations of its
inhabitants. When deciding on the constitutional restraints imposed
on a State's interference with individual rights, the vital question be-
comes one of balancing. It must be determined at what point the State
is interfering with individuals and at what point it is exercising valid
authority by regulating the well-being of children.
In his concurrence in Griswold, my brother Goldberg asked whether
a decree requiring all husbands and wives to be sterilized after the
birth of ten children would be valid. He answered the question in
the negative.87 But suppose that the husband and wife voluntarily sub-
mitted to sterilization. Would it then violate the Constitution? I think
not. Does it therefore follow that voluntary destruction of the fetus is
also protected from interference by the State? Perhaps-unless life is
present so that the State's compelling subordinating interest in the life
of one of its people predominates. However, I submit that until the
time that life is present, the State could not interfere with the inter-
ruption of pregnancy through abortion performed in a hospital or un-
der appropriate clinical conditions. I say this because State interfer-
8'7 Id. at 482.
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ence is permissible only if reasonably necessary to the effectuation of
a legitimate and compelling State interest .3 8 Prior to the time that life
is present in the fetus, what interest does the State have? Procreation
is certainly no longer a legitimate or compelling State interest in these
days of burgeoning populations. Moreover, abortion falls within that
sensitive area of privacy-the marital relation. One of the basic val-
ues of this privacy is birth control, as evidenced by the Griswold
decision. Griswold's act was to prevent formation of the fetus. This,
the Court found, was constitutionally protected. If an individual may
prevent conception, why can he not nullify that conception when pre-
vention has failed?
The common law courts uniformly held that an infant could not be
the subject of a homicide until its complete expulsion from the body of
the mother and the establishment of an independent existence. 9 The
distinction between fetal life and independent life is that the latter has
an independent circulatory system. 40 Hence, where the evidence
showed that an infant was killed before its birth was complete or was
killed by means used to assist in its delivery, it was not deemed a
homicide.41 Therefore, under the common law, abortion could not be
murder. These concepts and distinctions have been somewhat eroded
in recent years. At present the courts do not agree on the time when
life begins. The courts, however, have held an accoucheur responsible
for prenatal brain damage to an infant in a viable state.42 In this line
of cases, the courts have found that the unborn infant was a separate
biological entity and hence a legal one in contemplation of law, indi-
cating a departure from the requirement of an independent existence.
From this reasoning the courts may well take the unborn child into their
protective custody. Indications of such a trend are illustrated by the
abolition of the viability rule in some jurisdictions" and the repudiation
of the "live birth" doctrine by fourteen states. 44
To say that life is present at conception is to give recognition to the
potential, rather than the actual. The unfertilized egg has life, and if
fertilized, it takes on human proportions. But the law deals in reality,
not obscurity-the known rather than the unknown. When sperm
38 Id. at 503 (concurring opinion):
89 Morgan v. State, 148 Tenn. 417, 256 S.W. 433 (1923)..
40 State v. Prude, 76 Miss. 543, 24 So. 871 (1899).
41 Evans v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 589, 89 S.W. 974 (1905).
42 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
43 See PaossER ON TORTS (3d. ed. 1964).
44 Del Tufo, Recovery for Prenatal Torts: Actions for Wrongful Death, 15 RUTGERs
L. REV. 61 (1960).
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meets egg life may eventually form, but quite often it does not. The
law does not deal in speculation. The phenomenon of life takes time
to develop, and until it is actually present, it cannot be destroyed. Its
interruption prior to formation would hardly be homicide, and as we
have seen, society does not regard it as such. The rites of Baptism
are not performed and death certificates are not required when a mis-
carriage occurs.41 No prosecutor has ever returned a murder indict-
ment charging the taking of the life of a fetus. This would not be the
case if the fetus constituted human life.
It has been urged that the courts are the proper forum to determine
when life begins. I submit, however, that the professionals are better
able to determine when life begins than are the courts. Tort cases
might cast some light on the issue,46 but I would prefer that the courts
yield to the expert testimony of doctors. This testimony would vary
greatly, but that is nothing new to our judicial system.
This is not a question that will be easily resolved. Few questions
that reach the Supreme Court are. As was stated at the Christian Med-
ical Society's Symposium, "professionals . . . do not wish to play God
with human lives, whether in being or inchoate with life. But we can
inform our judgment . . . by the widest interchange, airing and con-
census. Humility is a large part of every professional's code.' '47  It
must be remembered that many imponderables are a part of Supreme
Court adjudications.
Accommodation of conflicting doctrine is more difficult to achieve
in the judicial than in the legislative process. Courts cannot reach out
to reform our society. A problem comes to the Court in the form of a
justiciable issue and is narrowly drawn, rendering the Court's ruling
contracted and finespun. Legislatures, on the other hand, have such
facilities for investigation as hearings and may address themselves to
the necessities of broad social needs and the correction of evils, both
probable and existing. As Mr. Justice Cardozo said, "Legislation
can eradicate a cancer, right some hoary wrong, correct some defi-
nitely established evil, which defies the feebler remedies, the distinc-
tions and the fictions familiar to the judical process. ' 48
45 Schwartz, Abortion and 19th Century Laws, TnRu June-July, 1967, at 41.
46 Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967);
Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966). Contra, Norman
v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954); Marko v. Philadelphia Transp.
Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966).
47 Prof. Thomas Lambert, Jr., Editor-in-Chief, American Trial Lawyers Ass'n, for-
mer Prof. of Law, Boston Univ.
48 B. CARwozo, GRowmr OF 'rm LAw 134 (1924).
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The courts work on a case-by-case system which deals with the past
rather than the future. Society would not have the benefit of the
sweeping effect of a statute, nor would the doctor have the protection
that he is entitled to receive. The case method would be slow, expen-
sive, and possibly disastrous. It is for the legislature to determine the
proper balance, i.e., that point between prevention of conception and
viability of the fetus which would give the State the compelling subor-
dinating interest so that it may regulate or prohibit abortion without
violating the individual's constitutionally protected rights.
The present climate seems favorable for immediate legislative action.
Five states have already led the way.4 With appropriate action,
many more will follow suit in liberalizing their abortion laws. But
this process will take less talk and more action. As Nehru once said:
I am tired of people who merely talk about things. However wise
you may be, you can never enter into the spirit of a thing if you only
talk about it and do nothing. Even scientists have a tendency to let
a wonderful experiment remain an experiment once it has been per-
formed. The next stage somehow does not come. They may well say
that the next stage is somebody else's job, but I think if the scientist had
a sense of practical application, he would either try to do it himself, or
get somebody else to do it. This association of thought with action is,
I think, of utmost importance. Thought without action is an abortion;
action without thought is folly.50
49 Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, California, and Colorado.
50 WISDOM, supra note 1.
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